Photo of Jeffrey Neuburger

Jeffrey Neuburger is co-head of Proskauer’s Technology, Media & Telecommunications Group, head of the Firm’s Blockchain Group and a member of the Firm’s Privacy & Cybersecurity Group.

Jeff’s practice focuses on technology, media and intellectual property-related transactions, counseling and dispute resolution. That expertise, combined with his professional experience at General Electric and academic experience in computer science, makes him a leader in the field.

As one of the architects of the technology law discipline, Jeff continues to lead on a range of business-critical transactions involving the use of emerging technology and distribution methods. For example, Jeff has become one of the foremost private practice lawyers in the country for the implementation of blockchain-based technology solutions, helping clients in a wide variety of industries capture the business opportunities presented by the rapid evolution of blockchain. He is a member of the New York State Bar Association’s Task Force on Emerging Digital Finance and Currency.

 

Jeff counsels on a variety of e-commerce, social media and advertising matters; represents many organizations in large infrastructure-related projects, such as outsourcing, technology acquisitions, cloud computing initiatives and related services agreements; advises on the implementation of biometric technology; and represents clients on a wide range of data aggregation, privacy and data security matters. In addition, Jeff assists clients on a wide range of issues related to intellectual property and publishing matters in the context of both technology-based applications and traditional media.

UPDATE:  Audio files of the oral argument in this appeal are available on the Web site of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

If the FBI wants to know where an individual is, and if the Department of Justice prevails in a case rescheduled for argument tomorrow in snowy Philadelphia, the FBI (or other law enforcement authorities) will be able to obtain that individual’s cell site data from the individual’s cellular carrier on a showing of “reasonable grounds” to believe that the data is “relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” This is an issue that may have important implications for law enforcement, with significant impact on wireless carrier operations (and costs), and dramatic implications for privacy in the wireless world.  In In re Application of the United States of America, No. 08-4227 (Third Cir.), attorneys for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, arguing as amicus curiae, will urge the appeals court to uphold a lower court ruling that applications for cell site data should be supported by a showing that satisfies the higher probable cause standard under the Fourth Amendment.

UPDATE: As discussed in this blog post, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overruled the district court in United States v. Nosal (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2011).

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The debate over the applicability of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in cases of alleged employee disloyalty has yielded quite a few rulings over the last several years, and generated a circuit split last September with the Ninth Circuit decision in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). In that civil action alleging employee theft and misappropriation of trade secrets, the appeals court rejected an expansive interpretation of the CFAA, concluding that an employee’s authorization to access an employer’s computer network is not automatically revoked when the employee is acting in a manner that is disloyal to the employer’s interest. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the contrary reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). In the Citrin case, Judge Posner authored a panel ruling that under common law agency principles, an employee who breaches the duty of loyalty to an employer thereby lacks authorization within the meaning of the CFAA.

The battleground in those two cases was whether a former employer could bring a civil action under the CFAA against former employees who accessed the employer’s computer network, while still employed, for disloyal purposes. The prize in these and many other such cases is the opportunity for the employer to pursue what what would have otherwise likely been largely a matter of state law in federal court. But the CFAA is primarily a criminal statute, and expansive interpretation could (and has) resulted in federal criminal prosecutions in what have been typically state law cases.

However, the Ninth Circuit’s narrower construction in LVRC v. Brekka ruling has now been applied in  one of those criminal cases, resulting in the dismissal of some but not all of the CFAA charges against one defendant in United States v. Nosal, 3:08-cr-00237-MHP(N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2009)

Apple probably could not have satisfied all the wild and hopeful imaginings of everyone who weighed in on what its new iPad device would look like, and what its functionality would be. Whether or not the iPad will be the content distribution game-changer that so many are looking for is another matter, but it’s still a pretty interesting device. In any case, however, the iPad does at least raise certain legal issues to consider.

As smart as lawyers have become in trying to address new technologies in agreements, there is always the question of whether a particular device or distribution method falls within the scope of the agreement.  In some cases, the party drafting the agreement is lucky enough to have their counterparty agree to unlimited, unrestricted descriptions of technology (e.g., in all media, technology and distribution methods, now known or hereafter to become known, anywhere in the Universe).  However, all the parties to technology oriented transactions are aware of the importance of this issue, and the counterparty in more cases than not will push back to limit the scope to the “intended” technology.

Which leads us to the question: Where will the iPad fall within the scope of these types of agreements?

We have previously described as "robust," the protection afforded interactive service providers from liability for defamatory contents posted by third parties by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.  But in Blockowitz v. Williams, 1:09-cv-03955 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2009), involving post-judgment efforts to have defamatory postings removed from a consumer complaint Web site ,  the protection comes, not from CDA Section 230, but from Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, which governs the enforcement of injunctions.

Perhaps predictably, for followers of CDA Section 230 jurisprudence, the consumer complaint Web site involved is the Ripoff Report, operated by perennial defendant Xcentric Ventures, Inc.

Since the Seventh Circuit opinion in ProCD v. Zeidenberg (7th Cir. 1996), judicial analysis of standard form contracts has proceeded along lines that have, in general, been more favorable to the efforts of sellers and licensors seeking to enforce the provisions of “agreement now, terms later” contracts. The ProCD v. Zeidenberg analysis of the relevant UCC provisions endorsed the enforceability of additional terms included in shrinkwrap and mail order “in the box” contracts on the theory that a purchaser or licensee who disagreed with the later-presented terms could reject the terms and avoid contract formation by returning the goods.

Over time, the ProCD v. Zeidenberg approach to later-presented terms has become the majority view. But just because a court adopts the ProCD v. Zeidenberg analysis, it will not necessarily find that a “terms later” contract is enforceable. That was the case in Defontes v. Dell, decided on December 10 by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

 To the great frustration of plaintiffs and their attorneys, and even some judges, courts have construed Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in such a way as to make it virtually impossible to hold a Web site operator liable for defamatory material that is posted on the site by a third party, even if the operator has knowledge of the defamatory nature of the material and refuses to remove it. Many plaintiffs have tried to plead around the robust protection provided by Section 230, but only a very few have succeeded. One of them is Cecilia Barnes, who alleged that she was defamed by false dating profiles posted by an ex-boyfriend on Yahoo!’s dating Web site. Any claim that Yahoo! was liable for the posting of the profiles by the ex-boyfriend is precisely the sort of claim that is barred by Section 230. But Barnes claimed that a separate promise by a Yahoo! employee to remove the profiles was not precluded.

Earlier this year, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit agreed with Barnes. The court concluded that because her claim alleged a separate undertaking by Yahoo!, distinct from the act of publishing the profiles, it did not implicate the Section 230 provision that bars holding a Web site operator liable as the “publisher” of information provided by a third party. The circuit court remanded the case for further consideration of Barnes’s surviving claim, which has now withstood a further motion to dismiss in the district court in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116274 (D. Ore. Dec. 8, 2009).

Jacobsen v. Katzer involves a dispute over rights in software code distributed pursuant to the open source Artistic License. Last year the case yielded one of the very few judicial rulings dealing with open source software. As we wrote at the time, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that open source licenses are enforceable only in a breach of contract action. In a broadly worded opinion that endorsed the open source approach to licensing, the court held that open source license restrictions are enforceable under U.S. copyright law, thereby making the federal courts, and the potent remedies under the Copyright Act, available to open source licensors.  
 
The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings, and has now yielded another ruling favorable to the plaintiffs on a number of critical points, including eligibility of software code that is distributed for free for copyright infringement damages.  Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2009) .