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UPDATE: On November 1, 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint (which apparently dropped the CFAA claim and asserted Lanham Act and DMCA claims).  Specifically, the plaintiff asserted, among other things, that defendant removed the copyright management information (CMI) from plaintiff’s listings and website source code. The court ruled that plaintiff failed to show that the generic copyright notice at the footer of each web page covered the listings and images that the defendant allegedly scraped, noting that “websites generally do not claim ownership or authorship over an image just because the image appears on the website.” With no evidence that the defendant removed or altered any CMI from the listings it allegedly scraped, the court held that the DMCA claim failed. Following the filing of a second amended complaint, the court, on March 22, 2019, dismissed the action, with prejudice. Regarding the DMCA claim, the court stated that it was “simply not reasonable to expect a viewer of the website to understand that each photograph was subject to protection when there is nothing near the photographs indicating who owns them. Had Alan Ross intended to assert copyright protection for the photographs it owned, it should have included a watermark or other mark on or near the listings, rather than a general copyright notice at the bottom of the page that does not indicate to what it refers.” The court ruled that a general copyright notice on the bottom of a webpage is not CMI “conveyed in connection with” photographs and listings contained on those webpages. Lastly, the court held that the link to plaintiff’s website terms was also not CMI “conveyed in connection with the work” because the terms were located on a separate page than the listings that were allegedly scraped and did not expressly state ownership of the images and listings, merely that unauthorized copying is prohibited.  Following the dismissal, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Seventh Circuit.

This past week, an Illinois district court dismissed, with leave to amend, claims relating to a competitor’s alleged scraping of sales listings from a company’s website for use on its own site. (Alan Ross Machinery Corp. v. Machinio Corp., No. 17-3569 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2018)).

The court dismissed a federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) claim that the defendant accessed the plaintiff’s servers “without authorization,” finding that the plaintiff failed to plead with specificity any damage or loss related to the scraping and did not allege that the unlawful access resulted in monetary damages of $5,000 or more as required to maintain a civil action under the CFAA.  In the court’s view, the “mere copying of electronic information from a computer system is not enough to satisfy the CFAA’s damage requirement.”  The court also dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract claims, concluding that defendant did not have notice of the plaintiff’s website terms and conditions based upon an unenforceable browsewrap agreement.

Courts are increasingly taking a magnifying glass to electronic contracting processes, particularly how the presentation of the terms of service and call to action are displayed.  As such, companies might take a second look at their own user registration and e-commerce purchase processes to ensure they offer reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and obtain manifestation of assent by the user to those terms.  Courts will generally enforce clickwrap style agreements as long as the layout and language of the site or mobile app give the user reasonable notice that a click will manifest assent to an agreement.  Last year, the Second Circuit, in the notable Meyer opinion, blessed Uber’s mobile contracting process, but in considering a similar Uber platform, a New York state court late last month declined to compel the arbitration of user claims due to what the court considered an “ambiguous registration process.”  (Ramos v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 28162 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. May 31, 2018)).  Such conflicting rulings highlight the importance of web design in determining if a service’s terms are deemed enforceable.

In a brief, unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of right of publicity and privacy claims against a host of self-publishing platforms and service providers for distributing an erotic (and purported “less than tasteful”) book whose cover contained an unauthorized copy of the plaintiffs’ engagement photo because the plaintiffs failed to plead more than an “incidental” use of the photo by the service providers. (Roe v. Amazon.com, No. 16-3987 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2017) (unpublished)).

This dispute initially raised our interest because it raised the larger issues of how to define a “publisher” and “distributor” in the modern e-commerce environment and to what extent an ebook platform or print-on-demand service could be protected for distributing third-party content by the immunity provided by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA Section 230”).  While we anticipated that such issues would get a full examination on appeal, the Sixth Circuit sidestepped these novel issues and decided the case on the merits of the privacy claims. 

In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling that had sent a putative class action against Amazon over its pricing practices to arbitration, as per Amazon’s terms of service. (Wiseley v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 15-56799 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2017) (unpublished)).  In finding that Amazon’s “Conditions of Use” were not unconscionable and presented in a reasonable manner, this holding differs from a Second Circuit decision from last year that declined to compel arbitration because reasonable minds could disagree regarding the sufficiency of notice provided to Amazon.com customers when placing an order through the website. (On remand, a New York magistrate judge ruled that the court should grant Amazon’s motion to compel arbitration on other grounds based upon the plaintiff’s constructive knowledge of the terms.)

UPDATE:  Last month, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, holding that there was no language in Homeaway’s “Basic Rental Guarantee” that makes any representation or warranty that Homeaway pre-screened listings before they were posted, as the document, at that time, simply established a process for obtaining a refund of up to $1000 (subject to certain conditions). (Hiam v. HomeAway.com, Inc., No. 17-1898 (1st Cir. Apr. 12, 2018)).  Beyond examining the Guarantee, the court followed the lower court’s reasoning that focused on HomeAway’s business-specific terms and conditions, which expressly notified users that listings are not pre-screened (“[W]e have no duty to pre-screen content posted on the Site by members, travelers or other users”).  With dismissal based upon the language of HomeAway’s Guarantee and site terms, the appeals court declined to opine on whether the dismissal was also justified on CDA Section 230 grounds.

In a resounding victory for well-drafted terms and conditions and robust immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA Section 230”), a Massachusetts district court granted summary judgment in favor of HomeAway, the online vacation rental marketplace, on two users’ claims stemming from a dispute over a property listing on the VRBO.com site. (Hiam v. HomeAway.com, Inc., No. 16-10360 (D. Mass. July 27, 2017)).   In its opinion, the court not only held that CDA Section 230 bars HomeAway from being treated as a “seller of travel services” under state consumer protection regulations, but also that HomeAway’s terms and conditions and privacy policy expressly disavowed any promises to pre-screen or monitor rental listings or release member information upon a user’s request.

In recent years, courts have issued varying rulings as to whether online or mobile users adequately consented to user agreements or terms of service when completing an online purchase or registering for a service.  In each case, judges have examined the facts closely, particularly the user interface that presents the terms to the user before he or she completes a transaction.  In an important ruling vindicating Uber’s user registration and electronic contracting process, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court and held that the notice of Uber’s terms of service was reasonably conspicuous and that the plaintiff unambiguously manifested assent to the terms, and therefore agreed to arbitrate his claims with Uber. (Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2017 WL 3526682 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 2017)).  While clearly good news for Uber in this litigation, in blessing Uber’s mobile contracting process, the court also established something of a template for other mobile apps to follow to ensure that their terms and conditions will be enforceable against their members or users. 

For years, craigslist has aggressively used technological and legal methods to prevent unauthorized parties from violating its terms of use by scraping, linking to or accessing user postings for their own commercial purposes.  In its latest judicial victory, on April 13, 2017, craigslist obtained a $60.5 million judgment against Radpad on various claims relating to harvesting content from craigslist’s site and sending unsolicited commercial emails to craigslist users. (Craigslist, Inc. v. RadPad, Inc., No. 16-01856 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017)).

This past summer, we wrote about two instances in which courts refused to enforce website terms presented in browsewrap agreements.  As we noted, clickthrough agreements are generally more likely to be found to be enforced.  However, even the enforceability of clickthrough agreements is going to depend, in part, on how the user experience leading to the “agreement” is designed.  Two recent decisions illustrate the importance of web design and the presentation of the “call to action” language in determining the enforceability of a site’s clickthrough terms.

In a decision from early November, a D.C. federal court ruled that an Airbnb user who signed up on a mobile device had assented to the service’s Terms and was bound to arbitrate his claims. (Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., 2016 WL 6476934 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016)).   Conversely, in a notable decision from late August, the Second Circuit refused to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiff was bound by the arbitration clause contained in Amazon’s terms and conditions because the plaintiff did not necessarily assent to and was on constructive notice of the terms when he completed the purchase in question. (Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2016 WL 4473225 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2016)).

In a dispute that touches on the intersection of copyright, contract law and cloud technology, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of copyright claims against Barnes & Noble (“B&N”) related to ebook samples stored on a user’s B&N-provided cloud-based locker. Notably, the Second Circuit dismissed the case on contractual grounds, declining the opportunity to opine on two important modern copyright doctrines that are often implicated when users store copyrighted content on the cloud.

In Smith v. BarnesandNoble.com, LLC, 2016 WL 5845690 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2016), an author contracted with Smashwords, an online ebook distributor, to market his book.  In accordance with this contract, the book was offered to B&N, which listed the book for sale on bn.com and made free samples available.  When a B&N customer downloaded a free sample (or purchased an ebook) the content was stored on a cloud-based digital locker associated with the customer’s account from which the content could be downloaded to devices whenever and wherever the user wanted.