

DOCKET NO.: DBD-CV25-6055202-S : SUPERIOR COURT
RIDGEFIELD LITTLE LEAGUE PARENTS :
ASSOCIATION, AS A CLASS REPRESENTATIVE : J.D. OF DANBURY
OF THE PARENTS OF RIDGEFIELD NATIONAL :
LITTLE LEAGUE : AT DANBURY
V. :
RIDGEFIELD NATIONAL LITTLE LEAGUE, ET AL. : AUGUST 14, 2025

DEFENDANT LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL, INCORPORATED
D/B/A LITTLE LEAGUE INTERNATIONAL, INC'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS

The Defendant, Little League Baseball, Incorporated d/b/a Little League International, Inc. (“LL International”) hereby joins the co-defendants in their motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. LL International respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Dismiss against the Ridgefield Little League Parents Association (“RLLPA” or “Plaintiff”) because the RLLPA lacks standing to bring this action. The RLLPA is a fictitious, unregistered entity with no legal existence and therefore has no standing to bring this action against LL International nor co-defendants. Further, Plaintiff has no standing to bring this action as no injury/harm has occurred. In the interest of judicial economy and resources, LL International adopts-by-reference the co-defendants’ arguments as to Sections I(1) and I(2) as the case law used and the arguments made would be identical to that of LL International, albeit applying them to LL International in lieu of the co-defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

The RLLPA initiated this action on July 3, 2025, by filing a summons and complaint with this Court against LL International, Ridgefield National Little League, and twenty-two board members of the Ridgefield National Little League. *See Docket*. The RLLPA states that it is “an organization of concerned parents of players in the Ridgefield National Little League.” *See*

Complaint, ¶ 1. The RLLPA then goes on to state that it is seeking not only injunctive relief, but damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees against all defendants. *Id.* The Plaintiff alleges this action arises from a “disturbing pattern of negligence, deception, and systemic failure” by the leadership of Ridgefield National Little League. *See Complaint*, ¶ 2. The Complaint goes on to state that the specific causes of action against all defendants are for (i) negligence, (ii) fraud, and (iii) CUTPA violations. *See Complaint, generally.* The Complaint specifically states that this “case seeks to prevent future tragedies,” however, Plaintiff fails to articulate a single previous tragedy as implied by this statement. *See Complaint*, ¶ 2. Additionally, the Complaint goes on to make additional statements regarding alleged harm done to children, such as stating the Defendants acted with “... a willful disregard for the well-being of children.” *Id.* These blanket statements of alleged harm are littered throughout Plaintiff’s Complaint, yet the RLLPA never pleads **actual** facts of **actual** harm done to any individuals. (emphasis added). Instead, the Complaint makes general allegations of misconduct and goes as far as to allege that future tragedies will occur such as a coach without proper training will be standing helpless on a field while a child’s life hangs in the balance. *Id.* This allegation, along with very similar allegations throughout the Complaint are not supported by fact and are added to merely evoke an emotional response from those who read this document.

Counsel for LL International and co-defendants appeared on July 16, 2025. On that same day, Plaintiff filed exhibits to the Complaint, despite the Complaint having already been filed and served two-weeks prior. Even with the provided exhibit, it is clear from a plain reading of the Complaint that the RLLPA has no standing to bring this action.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction...In deciding a jurisdictional question raised by a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to those alleged in the complaint, including facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader...[W]hen the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts...submitted in support of the motion to dismiss...the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint...If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counter affidavits...or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted). *North Sails Group, LLC v. Boards & More GmbH*, 340 Conn. 266, 269-70, 264 A.3d 1 (2021).

III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS

The RLLPA’s Complaint must be dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In in the interest of the judicial economy and preserving judicial resources, LL International hereby joins the co-defendants in their motion to dismiss and adopts-by-reference every aspect of co-defendants case law and arguments in the “Legal Arguments” Sections I(1) and I(2) of their memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss as these arguments also apply to LL International. Pursuant to Connecticut Rules, the specific motion being adopted by reference is Docket Entry No. 102.00, Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on August 13, 2025, by co-defendants Ridgefield Little League and Its Individual Board Members through their attorneys

Pastore LLC (“Co-Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss”). The specific pages being adopted-by-reference by LL International are attached hereto as Exhibit A.

a. Section I(1) - The Plaintiff Has No Legal Capacity to Sue

In the present matter, as articulated by co-defendants in Section I(1) of their Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff RLLPA is not a legally cognizable entity. The Complaint fails to allege that RLLPA is incorporated, registered, or otherwise recognized as a nonprofit, LLC, partnership, or voluntary association. The Complaint does not assert that RLLPA is a “person” under Connecticut law. Instead, it describes itself only as “an organization of concerned parents” and makes no allegations regarding formal membership, structure, governance, or legal capacity. *See Complaint*, ¶ 1. Importantly, the Complaint does not identify one member of the purported RLLPA. Accordingly, RLLPA is not a party with standing to sue.

Further, the RLLPA fails the test articulated in *Friend of Kingston* (previously briefed by co-defendants in Exhibit A) as it does not identify a single member of its purported class who has standing in their own right. It provides no facts establishing classical aggrievement suffered by any particular individual. The Complaint offers only vague descriptions of parental dissatisfaction and general grievances with league governance. Therefore, this is insufficient to establish the first prong of associational standing and thus deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Further, as briefed by co-defendants, to the extent the RLLPA attempts to proceed as a class representative under Practice Book § 9-7 *et seq.*, it fails to meet the threshold requirement of being a member of the class it purports to represent. RLLPA is neither a legally cognizable entity with standing to sue, nor a “parent” and therefore cannot represent a class of Ridgefield Little League parents as required by Connecticut law. The RLLPA is not a legal entity, fails to meet the

requirements for associational standing, and is not a member of the class it purports to represent, it lacks the capacity to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. The Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *See Exhibit A, Co-Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pgs. 15-19.*

b. The RLLPA Lacks Standing Because it Alleges No Actual or Particularized Injury

In the present matter, as further articulated by co-defendants in Section I(2) of their Motion to Dismiss, the RLLPA lacks standing because there is no allegation of actual or particularized harm. The closest the Complaint comes to an allegation of actual injury is its claim that Ridgefield Little League parents, including the members of RLLPA, were “induced to enroll their children in the RLL and pay its entry fees” as a result of allegedly false statements in safety publications. *See Complaint, ¶ 41.* But this conclusory claim is legally insufficient. The Complaint does not identify any specific parent who relied on those materials, nor does it claim any parent would have declined to participate had the statements not been made. It also fails to assert that the entry fees were excessive, misused, or paid under false pretenses. As with any other tort, in fraud, “the plaintiff, to recover, must prove that he has been injured.” *Beik v. Thorsen*, 169 Conn. 593 (1975). Here, Plaintiff has alleged no injury and therefore, lacks standing. *See Exhibit A, Co-Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pgs. 15-19.*

c. An Adoption-By-Reference Motion is Procedurally Proper

Our federal circuit has shown guidance to the state court's on adoption by reference motions. In quoting a prior decision on the subject, the First Circuit Court explained that “[a]doption by reference cannot occur in a vacuum and the arguments must actually be transferable from the proponent's to the adopter's case.’ Therefore, where, as here, an appellant ‘offer[s] no explanation as to why [his co-appellant's] arguments pertained to him,’ such ‘textbook perfunctory’ treatment waives the appellant's attempts to adopt-by-reference his co-appellant's

arguments.” *United States v. Ramirez-Rivera*, 800 F.3d 1, 12, n.1 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). Sections I(1) and I(2) of co-defendants’ memorandum of law are transferable and can be adopted-by-reference for LL International as the arguments for co-defendants and LL International on standing are identical. There is no intrinsic and/or novel legal aspect of these two arguments which would not apply to LL International, such as co-defendants arguments in Section I(3). Instead, these two sections articulate transferable issues, case law, and application of law on subject matter jurisdiction that apply to the co-defendants, LL International, and any other parties being sued by the RLLPA through this Complaint. As such, with an interest in preserving judicial resources by not refiling a lengthy memorandum of law, LL International adopts-by-reference the entirety of co-defendants case law and application of case law of Section I(1) and I(2) as its application to co-defendant is the same towards LL International.

IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the above-mentioned reasons, the RLLPA’s action should be dismissed, and all Defendants are entitled to relief because Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and lacks standing to bring this claim.

DEFENDANT,

LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL,
INCORPORATED D/B/A LITTLE
LEAGUE INTERNATIONAL, INC

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed postage pre-paid or electronically delivered on August 14, 2025, to all counsel and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served.

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EXHIBIT A

ARGUMENT

I. THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The Plaintiff in this action does not exist, period. It is not real. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because a plaintiff that does not exist lacks standing to sue. Further, Plaintiff lacks standing as to each of its claims because Plaintiff fails to plead actual injury. Therefore, this Court should grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.

1. Plaintiff RLLPA Has No Legal Capacity to Sue

"[W]here a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction." *Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc.*, 275 Conn. 363, 369 (2005). "One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." *Id.*

In Connecticut, a non-existent entity cannot maintain a lawsuit. "Only a party that actually or legally exists may bring a lawsuit. There must be some ascertainable persons, natural or artificial, to whom judgments may be awarded, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted except in the name of such person." *Inv. Assocs. v. Summit Assocs. Inc. et al.*, 309 Conn. 840, 859–60 (2013). "[I]t is elemental that in order to confer jurisdiction on the court the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is he or it must be a person in law or a legal entity with legal capacity to sue." *America's Wholesale Lender v. Pagano*, 87 Conn. App. 474, 477 (2005); *see also Greco Constr. v. Edelman*, 137 Conn. App. 514, 518–20 (2012); *Coldwell Banker Manning Realty, Inc. v. Cushman & Wakefield of Conn., Inc.*, 136 Conn. App. 683, 687–91 (2012); *America's Wholesale Lender v. Silberstein*, 87 Conn. App. 485, 486 (2005). "It appears well settled that the use of a

fictitious or assumed business name does not create a separate legal entity.” *Bauer v. Pounds*, 61 Conn. App. 29, 36 (2000).

Here, Plaintiff RLLPA is not a legally cognizable entity. (Pastore Aff., **Exh. P**). The Complaint fails to allege that RLLPA is incorporated, registered, or otherwise recognized as a nonprofit, LLC, partnership, or voluntary association. The Complaint does not assert that RLLPA is a “person” under Connecticut law. Indeed, it describes itself only as “an organization of concerned parents” (Compl. ¶ 1), and makes no allegations regarding formal membership, structure, governance, or legal capacity. Importantly, the Complaint does not identify one member of the purported RLLPA. Accordingly, RLLPA is not a party with standing to sue.

Nor does the Complaint satisfy the legal standards for associational standing under Connecticut law. While Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-76 allows a voluntary association to sue in its own name, that authority is limited by well-established judicial precedent. In *Friends of Kensington*, the court employed the three-part test for associational standing from *Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission*, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), which has been adopted by our Supreme Court and requires: (1) that at least one member of the organization has standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests sought to be protected are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) the claim asserted and relief requested do not require the participation of individual members. *Friends of Kensington Playground v. City of New Haven*, 2021 WL 3141289, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2021); *see also Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford*, 251 Conn. 169, 185 (1999).

As in *Friends of Kensington*, the RLLPA fails this test entirely. It does not identify a single member who has standing in their own right. It provides no facts establishing classical aggrievement suffered by any particular individual. The Complaint offers only vague descriptions

of parental dissatisfaction and general grievances with league governance. This is insufficient to establish the first prong of associational standing, and thus deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Further, to the extent the RLLPA attempts to proceed as a class representative under Practice Book § 9-7 *et seq.*, it fails to meet the threshold requirement of being a member of the class it purports to represent. “It is well established that a representative plaintiff must have individual standing to assert claims against all the members of a defendant class.” *Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp.*, 277 Conn. 617, 632 (2006). Moreover, “a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.” *Id.* at 634; *see also Blum v. Yaretsky*, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982) (“[i]t is not enough that the conduct of which the plaintiff complains will injure someone. The complaining party must also show that he is within the class of persons who will be concretely affected”). RLLPA is neither a legally cognizable entity with standing to sue, nor a “parent” (Compl. ¶ 1) and therefore cannot represent a class of Ridgefield Little League parents as required by Connecticut law.

Because RLLPA is not a legal entity, fails to meet the requirements for associational standing, and is not a member of the class it purports to represent, it lacks the capacity to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. The Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Plaintiff Lacks Standing Because It Alleges No Actual or Particularized Injury

“It is a basic principle of law that a plaintiff must have standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter

of the controversy.” *Unisys Corp. v. Dep’t of Lab.*, 220 Conn. 689, 693 (1991). Standing requires “a colorable claim of injury,” and “only those individuals who have suffered a direct injury” are entitled to invoke judicial power. *Johnson v. Rell*, 119 Conn. App. 730, 737 (2010); *Broadnax v. New Haven*, 270 Conn. 133, 156 (2004); *Maloney v. Pac.*, 183 Conn. 313, 321 (1981). A plaintiff must allege “a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy, **as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share**” and that the defendants’ conduct has “specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest.” *Andross v. Town of West Hartford*, 285 Conn. 309, 324 (2008) (emphasis added); *see also State Marshal Ass’n of Connecticut, Inc. v. Johnson*, 198 Conn. App. 392, 403 (2020). “Only those individuals who have suffered a *direct* injury would have standing.” *Broadnax v. New Haven*, 270 Conn. 133, 156 (2004) (original emphasis).

Here, Plaintiff alleges no actual harm or aggrievement to the RLLPA or to any of its alleged members. It relies instead on vague, speculative references to “exposing RLL players to risks ... and potentially irreparable harm” (Compl. ¶ 35), generalized grievances about internal league operations (e.g., board composition, safety procedures, and umpire oversight), and claims that “most” coaches lacked certain certifications (*id.* ¶¶ 17-19), without alleging any incident in which a child was injured or any parent suffered harm. Even assuming *arguendo* that the Complaint adequately pleads a breach of duty, “[r]egardless of any breach of a standard of care ... a compensable injury must occur in order for an action in negligence to survive.” *Poce v. O & G Indus., Inc.*, 210 Conn. App. 82, 94 (2022); *see also Right v. Breen*, 277 Conn. 364, 377 (2006) (“conduct that is merely negligent, without proof of an actual injury, is not considered to be a significant interference with the public interest such that there is any right to complain of it, or to be free from it.”). The Complaint expressly alleges precisely what our Supreme Court forbade in

Andross. It asserts only a broad, undifferentiated grievance shared (if at all) by all Ridgefield parents. Indeed, Plaintiff expressly frames the litigation as a public cause, stating, “This lawsuit is intended to be a national wake-up call” (Compl. ¶ 2), a concession that its objective is public awareness, not the redress of individualized harm.

The closest the Complaint comes to an allegation of actual injury is its claim that RLL parents, including the members of RLLPA, were “induced to enroll their children in the RLL and pay its entry fees” as a result of allegedly false statements in safety publications. (*Id.* ¶ 41). But this conclusory claim is legally insufficient. The Complaint does not identify any specific parent who relied on those materials, nor does it claim any parent would have declined to participate had the statements not been made. It also fails to assert that the entry fees were excessive, misused, or paid under false pretenses. As with any other tort, in fraud, “the plaintiff, to recover, must prove that he has been injured.” *Beik v. Thorsen*, 169 Conn. 593 (1975). Here, Plaintiff has alleged no injury at all, just disagreement and discontent.

Ultimately, this is a complaint built entirely on policy disagreements, conjecture, and generalized dissatisfaction. It seeks to vindicate perceived public interest rather than redress concrete legal injury. That is not sufficient to establish standing under Connecticut law. *See Maloney*, 183 Conn. at 320–21 (standing is designed to ensure that courts are not “vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests”). And, as should be obvious, it is not really a legal complaint. It is a ruse designed to punish the Moving Defendants for their refusal to cede RLL to Mr. Neiditch. No more, no less. Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.