First Amendment

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Can internet service providers necessarily be compelled to unmask anonymous copyright infringers? In an opinion touching on Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) subpoenas, First Amendment concerns, and fair use, the Northern District of California said, in this one particular instance, no, granting Twitter’s motion to quash a subpoena seeking to reveal information behind an anonymous poster. (In re DMCA § 512(h) Subpoena to Twitter, Inc., No. 20-80214 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2022)). The anonymous figure at the center of the dispute is @CallMeMoneyBags, an anonymous Twitter user who posts criticisms of wealthy people—particularly those working in tech, finance, and politics. Some such criticism lies at the heart of this dispute.

Web 3.0 and the promise of the metaverse has generated excitement about new markets for businesses large and small. But as with any technological frontier, legal uncertainties cause new risks to emerge alongside the opportunities. One area currently full of legal questions is trademark law. We will examine what we…

UPDATE: On the afternoon of May 28, 2020, the President signed the executive order concerning CDA Section 230. A copy/link to the order has not yet been posted on the White House’s website.

According to news reports, the Trump Administration (the “Administration”) is drafting and the President is set to sign an executive order to attempt to curtail legal protections under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230” or the “CDA”). Section 230 protects online providers in many respects concerning the hosting of user-generated content and bars the imposition of distributor or publisher liability against a provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions with respect to such user content. In response to certain moderation efforts toward the President’s own social media posts this week, the executive order will purportedly seek to remedy what the President claims is the social media platforms’ “selective censorship” of user content and the “flagging” of content that is inappropriate, “even though it does not violate any stated terms of service.”

A purported draft of the executive order was leaked online. If issued, the executive order would, among other things, direct federal agencies to limit monies spent on social media advertising on platforms that violate free speech principles, and direct the White House Office of Digital Strategy to reestablish its online bias reporting tool and forward any complaints to the FTC. The draft executive order suggests that the FTC use its power to regulate deceptive practices against those platforms that fall under Section 230 to the extent they restrict speech in ways that do not match with posted terms or policies.  The order also would direct the DOJ to establish a working group with state attorneys general to study how state consumer protection laws could be applied to social media platform’s moderation practices.  Interestingly, the executive order draft would also direct the Commerce Department to file a petition for rulemaking to the FCC to clarify the conditions when an online provider removes “objectionable content” in good faith under the CDA’s Good Samaritan provision (which is a lesser-known, yet important companion to the better-known “publisher” immunity provision).

Despite continued scrutiny over the legal immunity online providers enjoy under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), online platforms continue to successfully invoke its protections. This is illustrated by three recent decisions in which courts dismissed claims that sought to impose liability on providers for hosting or restricting access to user content and for providing a much-discussed social media app filter.

In one case, a California district court dismissed a negligence claim against online real estate database Zillow over a fraudulent posting, holding that any allegation of a duty to monitor new users and prevent false listing information inherently derives from Zillow’s status as a publisher and is therefore barred by the CDA. (924 Bel Air Road LLC v. Zillow Group Inc., No. 19-01368 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020)). In the second, the Ninth Circuit, in an important ruling, affirmed the dismissal of claims against YouTube for violations of the First Amendment and the Lanham Act over its decision to restrict access to the plaintiff’s uploaded videos. The Ninth Circuit found that despite YouTube’s ubiquity and its role as a public-facing platform, it is a private forum not subject to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment. It also found that its statements concerning its content moderation policies could not form a basis of false advertising liability. (Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 18-15712 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2020)). And in a third case, the operator of the messaging app Snapchat was granted CDA immunity in a wrongful death suit brought by individuals killed in a high-speed automobile crash where one of the boys in the car had sent a snap using the app’s Speed Filter, which had captured the speed of the car at 123MPH, minutes before the fatal accident. (Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., No. 19-4504 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020)).   

Such Scraping “Plausibly Falls within the Ambit of the First Amendment”

The Ninth Circuit is currently considering the appeal of the landmark hiQ decision, where a lower court had granted an injunction that limited the applicability of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) to the blocking of an entity engaging in commercial data scraping of a public website.  While we wait for that decision, there has been another fascinating development regarding scraping, this time involving a challenge to the CFAA brought by academic researchers.  In Sandvig v. Sessions, No. 16-1368 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2018), a group of professors and a media organization, which are conducting research into whether the use of algorithms by various housing and employment websites to automate decisions produces discriminatory effects, brought a constitutional challenge alleging that the potential threat of criminal prosecution under the CFAA for accessing a website “without authorization” (based upon the researchers’ data scraping done in violation of the site’s terms of use) violates their First Amendment rights.

In a preliminary decision, a district court held that the plaintiffs have standing and allowed their as-applied constitutional challenge to the CFAA to go forward with regard to the activity of creating fictitious accounts on web services for research purposes.  The decision contains vivid language on the nature of the public internet as well as how the plaintiffs’ automated collection and use of publicly available web data would not violate the CFAA’s “access” provision even if a website’s terms of service prohibits such automated access (at least with respect to the facts of this case, which involves academic or journalistic research as opposed to commercial or competitive activities).

"Internet exceptionalism" is the notion that the Internet is a special and unique communications medium to which special rules should apply. In the legal field, that notion is manifested in legal rules that have been crafted by judges, legislatures and regulators for application in situations involving Internet communications.

In some…

The above maxim is so often repeated that it is taken as true in all cases. But chapter 231, section 92 of the Massachusetts General Laws says otherwise, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Noonan v. Staples, No. 07-2159 (1st Cir. Feb. 13, 2009), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied (1st Cir. Mar. 19, 2009). Section 92 provides in its entirety as follows: "The defendant in an action for writing or for publishing a libel may introduce in evidence the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as libellous; and the truth shall be a justification unless actual malice is proved."

Construing Section 92 in a defamation action brought by a discharged employee, the appeals court concluded that "Massachusetts law … recognizes a narrow exception to [the defense of truth]: the truth or falsity of the statement is immaterial, and the libel action may proceed, if the plaintiff can show that the defendant acted with ‘actual malice" in publishing the statement.’

With the rough and tumble of the debate over the stimulus legislation starting to wind down, Congress is starting to turn to other subjects. The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held hearings yesterday on “libel tourism,” the filing of libel lawsuits against U.S. defendants in libel-plaintiff friendly countries such as the U.K.

This is not the first Congressional run at the subject, which is of particular interest to authors and media companies that publish online and thus are more likely to be susceptible to claims of harm caused in distant locations. Indeed, authors and publishers of print works that may be sold online to offshore purchasers should be concerned as well, as a foreign court may predicate jurisdiction on even a small number of such sales.